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Chapter 14
Extended Authorization  
(EA) Policies
TPM 2.0 has unified the way that all entities controlled by the TPM may be authorized. 
Earlier chapters have discussed authorization data used for passwords and HMAC 
authorization. This chapter goes into detail about one of the most useful new forms of 
authorization in the TPM, starting with a description of why this feature was added to the 
TPM and then describing in broad brushstrokes the multifaceted approach that  
was taken.
This new approach for authorization has many capabilities. As a result, if a user 
wants to restrict an entity so it can be used only under specific circumstances, it’s possible 
to do so. The sum total of restrictions on the use of an entity is called a policy. Extended 
authorization (EA) policies can become complex very quickly. Therefore this chapter’s 
approach is incremental, first describing very simple policies and gradually adding 





Flexible policies that can be changed on the fly•	
Throughout this chapter, you see examples of practical policies like those used in 
most cases. It turns out that building policies is different than using them, so you learn 
how a user satisfies a policy; at that point it should become clear why policies are secure.
Finally, you consider some policies that can be used to solve certain special cases. 
This section may spur your creativity—you’ll see that there are many more ways of using 
policies than you’ve thought of.
Let’s begin by comparing EA policies to using passwords for authentication.
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Policies and Passwords
All entities in the TPM can be authorized in two basic ways. The first is based on a 
password associated with the entity when it’s created. The other is with a policy that is 
likewise associated with the entity when it’s created. A policy is a means of authorizing 
a command that can consist of almost any approach to authorization that someone can 
think of. Some entities (hierarchies and dictionary attack reset handles) are created by 
the TPM and thus have default passwords and policies. The TPM-assigned name of these 
entities is fixed, not dependent on the policy that is used to authorize them. Such entities’ 
policies can be changed.
All other entities—NVRAM indexes and keys—have their name calculated in part 
from the policy that is assigned when they’re created. As a result, although their password 
can be changed, they have policies that are immutable. As you’ll see, some policies can be 
made flexible so they can be easily managed in spite of this immutability.
Anything that can be done directly with a password can also be done with a policy, 
but the reverse isn’t true. Some things (like duplicating a key) can only be authorized 
using a policy command. (However, making things more complicated, you can still use 
a password to authorize duplicating a key, by using a policy that describes a password 
authorization.)
A policy can be fine-tuned—everything is possible, from setting a policy to be the 
NULL policy that can never be satisfied, to having different authentication requirements 
for individual commands or for different users when applied to an entity. Thus EA is able 
to solve many issues that application developers need to deal with.
Why Extended Authorization?
EA in the TPM was created to solve the basic problem of manageability of TPM entity 
authorization. It makes it easier to learn how to use a TPM by having all TPM entities be 
authorized the same way, and it also allows a user to define authorization policies that 
can solve the following problems:
Allow for multiple varieties of authentication (passwords, •	
biometrics, and so on).
Allow for multifactor authentication (requiring more than one •	
type of authentication).
Allow for creation of policies without the use of a TPM. Policies •	
don’t contain any secrets, so they can be created entirely in 
software. That doesn’t mean secrets aren’t needed to satisfy  
a policy.
Allow attestation of the policy associated with an entity. It should •	
be possible to prove what authorization is necessary in order to 
use an entity.
Allow for multiple people or roles to satisfy a policy.•	
Allow restriction of the capabilities of a particular role for an •	
object to particular actions or users.
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Fix the PCR brittleness problem. In TPM 1.2, once an entity was •	
locked to a set of PCRs that measured particular configurations, 
if the configurations ever had to be changed, the entity could no 
longer be used.
Create a means to change how a policy behaves, providing •	
flexibility.
Multiple Varieties of Authentication
Today, many different kinds of techniques and devices are used for authentication. 
Passwords are the oldest (and perhaps weakest) form of authentication. Biometrics such 
as fingerprints, iris scans, facial recognition, penned signatures, and even cardiac rhythm 
are used for authentication. Digital signatures and HMACs are forms of cryptographic 
authentication used in tokens or keys. Time clocks in banks use the time of day as a form 
of authentication and don’t allow a vault to be opened except during business hours.
The TPM was designed so that objects can use almost any kind of authentication 
conceivable, although many forms require additional hardware. A policy can consist of a 
single type of authentication or multiple varieties.
Multifactor Authentication
Multifactor authentication is one of the most important forms of security and is 
popular today. It requires more than one means of authentication in order to provide 
authorization to execute a command. Those authentications may take many forms—
smart cards, passwords, biometrics, and so on. The basic idea is that it’s harder to defeat 
multiple authentication formats than it is to defeat a single one. Different forms of 
authentication have different strengths and weaknesses. For example, passwords can be 
easily supplied remotely—fingerprints less so, especially if the design is done correctly.
The TPM 2.0 design allows for many different forms of authentication and provides 
facilities to add even more using external hardware. Each mechanism that can be used for 
authentication is called an assertion. Assertions include the following:
Passwords•	
HMACs•	
Smart cards providing digital signatures•	
Physical presence•	
State of the machine (Platform Configuration Register [PCR])•	
State of the TPM (counters, time)•	
State of external hardware (who has authenticated to a fingerprint •	
reader, where a GPS is located, and so on)
A policy can require that any number of assertions be true in order to satisfy it. The 
innovation behind EA in the TPM is that it represents in a single hash value a complex 
policy consisting of many assertions.
Chapter 14 ■ extended authorization (ea) poliCies 
220
How Extended Authorization Works
A policy is a hash that represents a set of authentications that together describe how 
to satisfy the policy. When an entity (for example, a key) is created, a policy may be 
associated with it. To use that entity, the user convinces the TPM that the policy has been 
satisfied.
This is done in three steps:
1. A policy session is created. When a policy session with the 
TPM is started, the TPM creates a session policy buffer for that 
session. (The size of the session policy buffer is the size of the 
hash algorithm chosen when the session was started, and it’s 
initialized to all zeroes.)
2. The user provides one or more authentications to the TPM 
session, using TPM2_PolicyXXX commands. These change the 
value in that session policy buffer. They also may set flags in 
the session that represent checks that must be done when a 
command is executed.
3. When the entity is used in a command, the TPM compares the 
policy associated with the entity with the value in the session 
policy buffer. If they aren’t the same, the command will not 
execute. (At this point, any session flags associated with policy 
authorizations are also checked. If they aren’t also satisfied, 
this command isn’t executed.)
Policies don’t contain any secrets. As a result, all policies can be created purely 
in software outside a TPM. However, the TPM must be able to reproduce policies (in a 
session’s policy digest) in order to use them. Because the TPM has this ability, it makes 
sense for the TPM to allow the user to use this facility to produce policies. This is done by 
using a trial session. A trial session can’t be used to satisfy a policy, but it can be used to 
calculate one.
Policy sessions used to satisfy policies can be somewhat more complicated than 
the creation of a policy. Some policy commands are checked immediately and update a 
policy buffer stored in the session. Others set flags or variables in the session that must 
be checked when the session is used to authorize a command. Table 14-1 shows which 
policy commands require such checks.
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Table 14-1. Policy Commands that Set Flags
Command Sets Flag or Variable in Session Requiring the TPM to 
Check Something at Execution Time
TPM_PolicyAuthorize No
TPM_PolicyAuthValue Yes—sets a flag that requires an HMAC session to be 
used at command execution
TPM_PolicyCommandCode Yes—checks that a particular command is being 
executed
TPM_PolicyCounterTimer Yes—performs logical check against  
TPMS_TIME_INFO structured
TPM_PolicyCpHash Yes—checks that the command and parameters have 
certain values
TPM_PolicyLocality Yes—checks that the command is being executed from 
a particular locality
TPM_PolicyNameHash Yes—identifies objects that will be checked to be 









TPM_PolicyDuplicationSelect Yes—specifies where a key can be moved
TPM_PolicyPassword Yes—sets a flag that requires a password at command 
execution
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Creating Policies
Incredibly complicated policies are possible but are unlikely to be used in real life. In 
order to explain the creation of policies, this chapter introduces an artificial distinction 
between different kinds of policies, which are described in detail:
•	 Simple assertion policy: Uses a single authentication to create a 
policy. Examples include passwords, smart cards, biometrics, 
time of day, and so on.
•	 Multi-assertion policy: Combines several assertions, such as 
requiring both a biometric and a password; or a smart card and a 
PIN; or a password, a smart card, a biometric, and a GPS location. 
Such as policy is equivalent to using a logical AND between 
different assertions.
•	 Compound policy: Introduces a logical OR, such as “Bill can 
authorize with a smart card OR Sally can authorize with her 
password.” Compound policies can be made from any other 
policies.
•	 Flexible policy: Uses a wild card or placeholder to be defined 
later. A policy can be created in which a specific term can be 
substituted with any other approved policy. It looks like a simple 
assertion, but any approved (simple or complicated) policy can 
be substituted for it.
As mentioned, a policy is a digest that represents the means of satisfying the policy.  
A policy starts out as a buffer that is the size of the hash algorithm associated with an 
entity, but set to all zeroes. As parts of the policy are satisfied, this buffer is extended with 
values representing what has happened. Extending a buffer is done by concatenating the 
current value with new data and hashing the resulting array with the designated hash 
algorithm. Let’s demonstrate this with the simplest of all polices: those than require only 
one type of authorization to be satisfied.
Simple Assertion Policies
A simple Extended Authorization (EA) policy: the simple assertion policy, which consists 
of a single authentication, can be one of the following types:
Password or HMAC (policies that require proof of knowledge of •	
an object’s password)
Digital signatures (smart cards)•	
Attestation of an external machine (a particular biometric reader •	
attests that a particular user has matched, or a particular GPS 
attests that the machine is in a particular location)
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Physical presence (an indication such as a switch that proves •	
a user is physically present at the TPM. While this is in the 
specification, it is not likely to be implemented, so we will ignore 
it in the following.)
PCRs (state of the machine on which the TPM exists)•	
Locality (the software layer that originated the TPM command)•	
Internal state of the TPM (counter values, timer values, and so on)•	
Creating simple assertion policies can be done using the TPM itself, in three steps:





It’s passed a parameter TPM_SE_TRIAL to tell the TPM to start 
a trial session, and a hash algorithm to use for calculating the 
policy. This returns (among other things) the handle of a trial 
session. It’s referred to as myTrialSessionHandle.
2. Execute TPM2 policy commands that describe the policy 
(described shortly).





and passing it the handle of the trial session: myTrialSessionHandle).




again passing it the name of the trial session: myTrialSessionHandle.
Because steps 1, 3, and 4 are common to all simple assertions, they aren’t repeated in 
the following; we merely describe the second step for each command.
Passwords (Plaintext and HMAC) of the Object
Passwords are the most basic form of authentication used today, but they’re far from the 
most secure. Nonetheless, because they’re in use in so many devices, it was important 
that the TPM support them. (The TPM 1.2 did not support passwords in the clear—only 
proof of knowledge of the password using an HMAC. The TPM 2.0 supports both.) It’s 
assumed that when a password is used, the device provides for a trusted path between 
the password entry and the TPM. If this doesn’t exist, facilities are present in the TPM 2.0 
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architecture to allow for using a salted HMAC session to prove knowledge of a password 
without sending it in the clear, as seen in Chapter 13. When an object is loaded into a 
TPM, the TPM knows its associated password. Therefore, the policy doesn’t need to 
include the password. Thus the same policy can be used with different entities that have 
different passwords.
Creating a simple assertion policy can be reduced to four steps:
1. Set the policy buffer to all zeroes, with the length equal to the 
size of the hash algorithm.  
2. Concatenate TPM_CC_PolicyAuthValue to this buffer. 
3. Substitute the value of TPM_CC_PolicyAuthValue from its 
value in part 2 of the specification. 
4. Calculate the hash of this concatenation, and put the result in 
the buffer. This end result is the policy for a simple assertion. 
Figure 14-1. Initializing the Policy
Figure 14-4. Hashing the result provides a new value for the buffer
Figure 14-2. Concatenation of the buffer with the policy data per the Specification
Figure 14-3. Substituting the value of TPM_CC_PolicyAuthValue
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When this policy command is executed, the policy buffer of the session is set to this 
final value. In addition, a flag is set in the TPM’s session specifying that when a command 
with an object in it that requires authorization is used, a password session must be 
provided with that command and the password provided must match that of the object.
Similarly, when a policy is created to use the HMAC assertion (TPM2_PolicyAuthValue), 
two things happen
1. The policy is extended with the value TPM_CC_PolicyAuthValue.
2. A flag is set in the TPM’s session indicating that when objects 
requiring authorization are used, a separate HMAC session 
is required. The TPM checks the password HMAC against the 
object’s authorization data and allows access if they match 
(see Chapter 13.)
If you’re using a trial session to create the policy, you accomplish this by executing 
the command TPM2_PolicyAuthValue and passing it the handle of the trial session.
This inherently means that when you’re using passwords, either in plaintext or as 
an HMAC, either the plaintext password or the HMAC must be included to authorize a 
command with a policy session. The fact that TPM_CC_PolicyAuthValue appears twice 
in the previous explanation isn’t a typo: the repetition means the choice of password 
or HMAC isn’t decided when the policy is created, but rather when the non-policy 
command is executed. It’s up to the user of the entity, not the creator of the entity, to 
decide how they will prove their knowledge of the password to the TPM.
Passwords aren’t the most secure means of authentication. A much more secure 
approach is to use a digital signature, often implemented with a smart card such as a 
United States Department of Defense (DoD) Common Access Card (CAC card) or United 
States Federal Personal Identity Verification (PIV) card.
Passwords of a Different Object
A new (and very useful) assertion policy in TPM 2.0 is an assertion that the user knows 
the password of an entity different from the one being used. Although this might seem odd 
at first, it’s particularly useful because of the difference in the behavior of NVRAM entities 
versus key objects. When the password of a key object is changed with TPM2_ChangeAuth, 
what is really happening is that a new copy of the key is being created that has a new 
password. There is no guarantee that the old copy is discarded. This is because key objects 
normally reside in files outside the TPM, and the TPM therefore can’t guarantee that the 
old copy of the key file has been erased. However, NV entities reside entirely in the TPM:  
if their password is changed, it really is changed. The old copy can no longer be used.
This means if a key is created and a policy is created for it that requires the user 
to prove knowledge of an NV entity’s password, it’s possible to change the password 
necessary to use the key without worrying that the old password can still be used to 
authorize the key. In this case, changing the password of the NV entity effectively changes 
the password of the key. TPM 2.0 allows you to make authorization of a key dependent on 
knowing an NVRAM entity’s password.
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This further provides opportunities to manage the passwords of a large number of 
entities. Suppose you create a policy that points to a particular NV index’s password, and 
then you associate that policy with a large number of keys. You can effectively change the 
password of all those keys by changing the password of the one NV index.
The TPM2_PolicySecret command requires you to pass in the name of the object 
whose password is required to satisfy the policy. It’s perhaps not obvious, but when 
creating the policy for an object, you can’t pass in the name of the object being created. 
This is because the name of the object depends on the policy, and if the policy depends 
on the name of the object, a vicious circle is created. This explains why the  
TPM2_PolicyAuthValue command is also needed. It provides a way of pointing to the 
authorization of the object being authorized.
To calculate the policy in a trial session, you execute the command TPM2_PolicySecret 
and pass it the handle of the trial session, as well as the handle of the object whose 
authorization will be used. Doing so extends the session policy buffer with  
TPM_CC_PolicySecret || authObject→Name || policyRef. The variable of note that 
is passed to the command is, of course, a handle for the object whose authorization will 
be used. As explained regarding names, although the handle of that object is passed to 
the TPM when executing TPM_CC_PolicySecret, the TPM internally uses the Name of the 
object in extending the session policy buffer. This prevents a change in the handle from 
causing a security exposure.
Technically, you need to include an authorization session for the handle of the 
object being authorized when executing this command. Although the specification 
indicates that it doesn’t need to be satisfied in a trial session, most implementations 
require it. Therefore you must also include a correct password or HMAC session when 
executing this command. If you instead calculate the policy without using the TPM, this 
requirement isn’t necessary.
Digital Signatures (such as Smart Cards)
It wasn’t generally possible to authenticate use of a TPM 1.2 entity using a private key. 
In TPM 2.0, this has changed. It’s now possible to require a digital signature as a form of 
access control. When a policy is formed using this assertion, the policy value is extended 
with three values: TPM_CC_PolicySigned, SHA2561(publicKey) and a policyRef.  
(A policyRef is used to identify precisely how the signed assertion will be used. Often it 
will be left as an Empty Buffer, but if a person is asked to authorize an action remotely, 
that person may want to precisely identify what action is being authorized. If the 
policyRef is part of the policy, the authorizing party will have to sign that value when 
authorizing the action.)
This can be done using a trial session by using the TPM2_PolicySigned command; 
but before this can be done, the TPM must know the public key used to verify the 
signature. This is done by loading that public key into the TPM first. The easy way to do 
this is to use a TPM2_LoadExternal command and load the public key into the  
TPM_RH_NULL hierarchy. You do so with the command TPM2_LoadExternal, passing in 
the public key structure.
1SHA256 is used throughout this book as the hash algorithm for everything except PCRs. However, 
technically you can use any hash algorithm that matches that chosen when the policy is created.
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This returns a handle to the loaded public key, for now called aPublicHandle. Then 
you execute the command TPM2_PolicySigned, passing in the handle of the trial session 
and the handle of the loaded public key.
Satisfying this policy is trickier. Proving to the TPM that the user has the smart card 
with the private key that corresponds to this public key is a bit more involved. This is done 
by using the private key to sign a nonce produced by the TPM. You see this in detail at the 
end of this chapter.
Another assertion can be required: that the TPM resides in a machine that is healthy. 
This is done with PCRs.
PCRs: State of the Machine
Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs) in a TPM are typically extended by preboot or 
postboot software to reflect the basic software running on a system. In the 1.2 design, only 
a few things could use this authorization. Further, because using PCRs to restrict use of 
TPM 1.2 keys is a brittle operation, the restriction made this feature difficult to use.
In the 2.0 design it’s possible to require that PCRs contain particular values for 
authorizing any command or entity. The policy merely has to specify which PCRs are 
being referenced and the hash of their values. Additionally, TPM 2.0 includes multiple 
ways of handling the brittleness. Again, all policies begin as a variable of size equal to the 
hash algorithm and initialized to zero. To use the PCR assertion, the policy is extended with  
TPM_CC_PolicyPCR || PCRs selected || digest of the values to be in the PCRs selected.
If a trial session is being used to calculate this policy, the user first selects the PCRs 
they wish to have defined values and puts them into a TPML_PCR_SELECTION. The user 
then calculates the hash of the concatenation of the defined values, calling the result 
pcrDigest. Then the user executes the command TPM2_PolicyPCR, passing in again the 
handle of the trial session and the PCRs selected and the pcrDigest just calculated.
When a user wishes to use an entity locked to PCRs, they execute the TPM2_PolicyPCR 
command, passing it the list of PCRs selected and the expected value of pcrDigest. 
Internally the TPM calculates the digest of the then-current values of those PCRs, checks 
it against the passed in value, and, if they match, extends the session’s digest with  
TPM_CC_PolicyPCR || PCRs selected || digest of the values currently in the PCRs selected.
This might leave a security hole—what if the PCR values change after the assertion 
is made? The TPM protects against this by recording its PCR-generation counter in the 
TPM session state as TPM_PolicyPCR is executed. Each time any PCR is extended, the 
TPM generation counter is incremented. When the policy session is used to authorize a 
command, the current state of the generation counter is matched against the recorded 
value. If they don’t match, it indicates that one or more PCRs have changed, and the 
session is unable to authorize anything.
As added flexibility, the platform-specific specification can indicate that certain 
PCRs will not increment the TPM generation counter. Changes to those PCRs will not 
invalidate the session.
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Locality of Command
The 1.2 design had a characteristic called locality that was used to designate which 
software stack originated a command when it was sent to the TPM. The main usage in  
1.2 was to provide proof that a command originated when the CPU was in a peculiar mode 
caused by entering either the Intel TXT or AMD-V command (in Intel or AMD processors, 
respectively). These commands are used for the Dynamic Root of Trust Measurement 
(DRTM) when the machine is put into a vanilla trusted state while in the midst of 
operations, so that the state of the machine’s software can be reported in a trusted manner.
In 2.0, just as PCR assertions are extended for use whenever authorization can  
be used, locality is extended to a general-purpose assertion. When locality is used as an 
assertion in a policy, the session policy digest is extended with TPM_CC_PolicyLocality || 
locality(ies).
When using the trial session to calculate the policy, you execute the command 
TPM2_PolicyLocality, passing in the handle of the trial session and the locality structure, 
TPMA_LOCALITY, found in part 2 of the specification.
When satisfying a locality for a session, the user uses TPM2_PolicyLocality to pass 
the localities to which the session is to be bound. Then two things happen:
1. The session digest is extended with TPM_CC_PolicyLocality 
|| locality(ies).
2. A session variable is set, recording the locality passed in.
When a command is then executed with that session, the locality from which the 
command is coming is compared to the locality variable set in the session. If they don’t 
match, the command will not execute.
In the 1.2 specification, there were five localities—0, 1, 2, 3, and 4—which were 
represented by a bitmap in a single byte. This allowed you to select several localities at 
a time: for example, 0b00011101 represented the selection of localities 0, 2, 3, and 4. In 
the 2.0 specification, this result can be easily achieved using the PolicyOr command; 
but to reduce the cognitive load on people moving from 1.2 to 2.0, the localities 0–4 are 
represented the same way as before.
The problem with this solution is that it limits the number of localities available. It 
was possible to add three more localities, represented by bits 5, 6, and 7. However, the 
mobile and virtualization workgroups in TCG wanted more. This resulted in a bit of a 
hack in the specification. To extend the number of localities, the byte values above the 
fifth bit are used to represent single localities. This results in localities of the form 0, 1, 2, 
3, 4, 32, 33, 34, ...255. That is, there is no way to represent localities 5–31. This is shown in 
Table 14-2. Note the change that happens when the value is 32.
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Localities can be used in a number of places. They can represent the origin of a 
command used to create an entity. They can also be used to lock functions so they can be 
used only if the command originates from a certain location. In 1.2, the locality was used 
to allow the CPU to control resetting and extending certain PCRs (for example, 17 and 18) 
to record putting the PC in a known state before doing a DRTM. Trusted Boot (tboot) is a 
program available on SourceForge2 that shows how this is used; Flicker,3 a program from 
CMU, used tboot to do run security-sensitive operations in a memory space separate 
from the OS.
Localities therefore tell the TPM where a command originated. The TPM inherently 
knows the values of its internal data, and localities can also be used for authorization 
restrictions.
Table 14-2. Locality Representations and the Locality(ies) They Represent
Value Binary Representation Locality(ies) Represented
0 0b00000000 None
1 0b00000001 Locality 0
2 0b00000010 Locality 1
3 0b00000011 Localities 0, 1
4 0b00000100 Locality 2
5 0b00000101 Localities 0, 2
6 0b00000110 Localities 1, 2
7 0b00000111 Localities 0, 1, 2
8 0b00001000 Locality 3
9–30 . . . . . .
31 0b00011111 Localities 0, 1, 2, 3, 4
32 0b00100000 Locality 32
33 0b00100001 Locality 33
34 0b00100010 Locality 34
35–254 . . . . . .
255 0b11111111 Locality 255
2http://sourceforge.net/projects/tboot/.
3http://flickertcb.sourceforge.net.
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Internal State of the TPM (Boot Counter and Timers)
TPM 1.2 had both an internal timer that measured the amount of time elapsed since 
the TPM was last powered on (and that could be correlated with an external time) and 
internal monotonic counters. Neither could be used as authentication elements. TPM 2.0  
has a timer, a clock, and boot counters, which can be used in complicated formulas to 
provide for new assertions. A boot counter counts the number of times the machine has 
been booted. The timer is the amount of time since the TPM started up this time. The 
clock is similar to a timer, except that it (mostly) can only go forward in time, can be set 
equal to an external time, and stops whenever the TPM loses power.
These can be used to restrict usage of a TPM entity to only work when a boot counter 
remained unchanged, or when the clock is read between certain times. The entity’s use 
can also be restricted to daylight hours. The latter is the most likely use case—restricting a 
computer to accessing files only during business hours helps protect data if a hacker gets 
access to the network at night.
The TPM can always check the values stored in its internal clock and boot counter, so 
they’re referred to as internal states. Internal state assertions require that a policy session 
be created before the command is executed and that the assertion be satisfied before the 
command is executed. They need not be true when the command is actually executed.
This is done by extending a policy with TPM_CC_PolicyCounterTimer || HASH(Time 
or Counter value || offset to either the internal clock or the boot 
counter || operation). The operation parameter indicates the comparison being 
performed. The table of operations is in part 2 of the specification: a set of two-byte values 
representing equality, non-equality, greater than, less than, and so on.
Using the trial session to create such a policy involves sending TPM2_
PolicyCounterTimer with four parameters: the handle of the trial session; an indication 
as to whether the comparison is being done to the timer, the clock, or the boot counter; 
something to compare that value to; and the comparison being done.
Although these values are considered the TPM’s internal state values, it’s also true 
that the TPM can read values that are in any of its NV index locations. Those can also be 
used for policy commands.
Internal Value of an NV RAM Location 
A new command for the TPM 2.0 specification allows the use of an entity based on the 
value stored in a particular NVRAM location. For example, if an NV index is associated 
with 32 bits of memory, you can gate access to a TPM entity based on whether one of 
those bits is a zero or a one. If each bit is assigned to a different user, a user’s access to a 
particular entity can be revoked or enabled by simply changing a single bit in an NVRAM 
location. Of course, this means the person with authority to write to that NVRAM location 
has the ultimate authority for using the key.
This command is more powerful than that, because logical operations on the 
NVRAM location are allowed. So you could say that the entity could be used only if
 
6 <= NVRAM location <8 OR 9 < NVRAM location < 23
 
was a true statement.
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NVRAM locations in a 2.0 TPM can be set to be counters. This means you can use 
them in clever manipulations in a policy that can make a counter useable only n time. An 
example of this is shown later in the chapter.
This works by extending the policy buffer with TPM_CC_PolicyNV || calculated 
Value || name of NV location. The calculated value is HASH(value to compare to 
|| offset into the NVRAM location || number that represents the operation), 







Unsigned greater than or equal.•	
Signed greater than or equal.•	
Unsigned less than or equal.•	
Signed greater than or equal.•	
All bits match the challenge.•	
If a bit is clear in the challenge, it’s also clear in memory.•	
Using these functions, you can allow all values greater than 1 or less than 1,000. 
When you get to multifactor authentication, you can combine these to have a value that is 
between 1 and 1000, including or not including the endpoints.
You can use a trial session to create this policy by executing TPM2_PolicyNV with the 
same parameters used in the TPM2_PolicyCounterTimer command: the handle of the 
trial session, the index being compared (and the offset from the beginning of the index), 
the thing to compare against, and how it is to be compared.
If you consider an entity like a lock, the value of the NVRAM is like the tumblers.  
If their state is correct, the entity can be used. Locks open if their internal state is correct.
However, TPM 2.0 allows something more interesting: an entity can be used according 
to the state of a device external to the TPM.
State of the External Device (GPS, Fingerprint Reader,  
and So On)
Perhaps one of the most interesting new assertions in the TPM design is the ability 
to use an assertion that is dependent on the state of an external device. The device is 
represented by a public/private key pair. The state of the device may be anything the 
device can use its private key to sign (together with a nonce from the TPM). If the device 
is a biometric, it may be as simple as “Bob just authenticated himself to me.” If it’s a 
GPS unit, it may be “My current position is Baltimore.” If it’s a time service, it may be 
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“The current time is business hours.” The assertion identifies both the public key that 
represents the external device and the value expected. The TPM does nothing more 
than compare the signature and the identified information with what it’s expecting. It 
doesn’t perform calculations on the resulting information, so the device making the 
representation needs to decide if its input matches the thing it’s signing.
This provides flexibility for a biometric: if Bob has registered several fingerprints 
with the matcher, the TPM doesn’t need to know which one was signed with—just that 
the match corresponds to “Bob.” A GPS coordinate need not be exact—just in a specified 
area. The assertion need not specify an exact time, but rather an identifier for the range 
of times that are acceptable. However, the flexibility isn’t entirely general. This doesn’t 
say “Some fingerprint reader attests that Bob has authenticated to the device”; it says 
“This particular fingerprint reader (as demonstrated by a signature) attests that Bob has 
authenticated to the device.” This allows the creator of the policy to determine which 
biometric (or other devices) it trusts to not be easily spoofed.
Once this policy is satisfied, there are no further checks, so it’s possible for an 
assertion to no longer be satisfied when the TPM actually executes the command.
Creating the policy is done by starting with a variable of size equal to the hash 
algorithm and initialized to zero. This is then extended with TPM_CC_PolicySigned || 
SHA256(publicKey) || stateOfRemoteDevice, where stateOfRemoteDevice consists of 
two parts: the size of the description followed by the description.
If you’re using a trial session to create this policy, you execute the command  
TPM2_PolicySigned. Again, you must pass the handle of the trial session, the handle 
of the public key that corresponds to the private key of the device, and the state of the 
remote device that it will sign when the policy is satisfied. For example, if the remote 
device is a fingerprint reader, the device may sign “Sally correctly authenticated.”
Sometimes the object’s creator doesn’t really know under what circumstances they 
want a key to be used. Perhaps the key will be used in case of an emergency, and the 
creator doesn’t know who will use the key or how. This is a use case for a wild card policy.
Flexible (Wild Card) Policy
One major problem with the TPM 1.2 design was the brittleness of PCRs. When an entity 
was locked to a PCR, it was not possible to change the required values of the PCR after 
it was so locked. PCR0 represents the BIOS firmware, which is security critical. If PCR0 
changed, it could indicate a security breach. As a result, applications like Microsoft 
BitLocker use it for security. However, BIOS firmware may need to be upgraded. When it’s 
upgraded, the value of PCR0 will change, which makes anything locked to that PCR no 
longer useable.
Programs got around this limitation by decrypting keys, upgrading the BIOS, and 
then re-encrypting the keys to the new value of PCR0. However, this process is messy 
and leaves keys exposed for a short period of time while the upgrade is taking place. As 
a result, it was important that EA be able to allow for changing of the values to which a 
PCR was locked without decrypting the locked data. But it needed to also be obvious 
to anyone who wished to check the policy under what circumstances the policy could 
be changed. A number of possibilities were considered, including having yet another 
authorization whose only use was to change the policy.
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The solution chosen was clever and is given using the command  
TPM2_PolicyAuthorize, which I call a wild card policy. A wild card policy is owned by 
a private key whose public key is associated with the wild card. In poker, a wild card 
can substitute for any card the holder of the wild card wishes. A wild card policy can 
substitute for any policy the owner of wild card wishes. Any policy approved by the owner 
of a wild card can be used to satisfy the wild card policy. Policies also can be restricted 
with a wildCardName that can be given to the wild card when it’s created. This allows 
the owner of the wild card to specify that only wild cards with a particular name can 
substitute for a particular policy. A wild card associated with an OEM’s BIOS signing key 
could theoretically be used to approve any BIOS signed by the OEM.
The wild card policy is created in a way similar to the command used for the state 
of an external device, by extending a policy session with TPM_CC_PolicyAuthorize 
|| keySign→nameAlg || keyName || wildCardName. Just as with the PolicySigned 
assertion, if you’re using a trial session to create a wild card policy, you first have to load 
the public key into the TPM (using the TPM2_LoadExternal command) and then execute 
the PolicyAuthorize command.
TPM2_LoadExternal returns the handle of the loaded public key, here called 
aPublicHandle. Then you can execute TPM2_PolicyAuthorize, passing it the handle of 
the trial session, wildCardName, and aPublicHandle.
TPM2_PolicyAuthorize is one of the most useful policies in the TPM, because it’s 
the only way to effectively change a policy after an object has been created. This means 
if objects have been locked to one set of PCR values (corresponding to a particular 
configuration), and the configuration has to change, the objects’ policy can be effectively 
changed to match the new set of configuration values. You see a number of other uses as 
well in the “Examples” section.
Command-Based Assertions
Although not strictly an assertion, it’s possible to restrict a policy so that it can only be 
used for a particular command. For example, you can restrict a key so that it can be used 
for signing but not to certify other keys. If this is done, then the policy can only be used 
to do that one particular command. Generally this isn’t done as a single assertion, but 
it could be. By declaring in a key’s policy that it can only be used for signing, the key is 
prevented either from certifying another key or from itself being certified. This is because 
when a key is certifying or being certified, it needs to provide an authorization that can’t 
be provided.
To create such a policy assertion, you create a policy variable of size equal to the 
hash algorithm and initialize it to zero. It’s then extended with the value  
TPM_CC_PolicyCommandCode || the command code to which the policy  
is to be restricted.4 If you’re using a trial session to create this policy, you execute  
TPM2_PolicyCommandCode, passing it the handle of the trial session and the command code.
Usually, if you’re restricting a TPM entity like a key to only be used in a single 
command, you also want to authenticate use of that key for that command. This requires 
that more than one restriction be placed on the key, which is the subject of multifactor 
authentication.
4The TPM_CC listing table is found in part 2 of the specification.
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Multifactor Authentication
The TPM knows how to authenticate using assertions. It also can be told to require more 
than one of them. For example, it may be asked to specify that both a fingerprint and a 
smart card be used to provide authentication to log in to a PC.
Policies, as you’ll see, build together in a way similar to the way PCRs are extended. 
They start with an initial value of all zeroes (the number of zeroes depends on the size 
of the hash algorithm used to create the policy). When a policy command is invoked, 
the current policy value is extended by appending a new parameter to the old value, 
hashing the result, and then replacing the old value with the result of this calculation. 
This calculation is called extending in PCRs. A logical AND in a policy is accomplished 
by extending the new assertion into the policy. Just like a PCR, the policy is initialized to 
all zeroes before the first assertion, but later assertions build on the value created by the 
previous assertion.
This means if you’re using a trial session to build this kind of policy, you start and 
end exactly the same way—you just add more commands in the middle to correspond to 
the various ANDed assertions.
Example 1: Smart card and Password
If you wish to require that both a smart card that signs with a key, whose public part is S, 
and a password be used in a policy, you create a policy by first extending
 
TPM_CC_PolicySigned || SHA256(publicKey) || 0x0000 = 0x0000060 || SHA256(S) 
||0x00005
 










Extending a new requirement is equivalent to a logical AND.
Using a trial session, you first load the public key into the TPM and then execute 
the three commands used in each of the simple assertion policies: TPM2_PolicySigned, 
TPM2_PolicyAuthValue, and TPM2_PolicyLocality.
5 In this case you don’t assign a PolicyReference to this signature, so the last appended value is 
0x0000, which is 2 bytes of 0, which means the value of the PolicyReference of the signature  
is EmptyBuffer.
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Example 2: A Policy for a Key Used Only for Signing  
with a Password
In this example, Bob creates a key that requires a key only be used for signing, and only if 
a password is presented for the key. Start with a policy of all zeroes, and first extend it with
 
TPM_CC_PolicyCommandCode || TPM_CC_Sign = 0x0000016C || 0x0000015D
 
Then extend it again with
 
TPM_CC_PolicyAuthValue =0x000016B
Example 3: A PC state, a Password, and a Fingerprint
In this example, Bob creates a key which requires that PCR1 be equal to an 
approvedPCRdigest, a password, and a fingerprint. When crafting a policy that involves 
a PCR digest, it’s generally good practice to start with that term first. This is because if it 
fails, there is no need to bother the user with a password and a fingerprint.
You use the TPM to create this policy value as follows:
1. Start a trial session.
2. Use TPM2_PolicyPCR to lock the policy to approvedPCRdigest.
3. Use TPM2_PolicyAuthValue (to require a password at execution).
4. Load the publicKey of the fingerprint reader.
5. Use TPM2_PolicySigned pointing to the public key and 
stateOfRemoteDevice (which is “Bob’s finger”).
6. Get the value of the policy from the TPM.
7. End the session.
Example 4: A Policy Good for One Boot Cycle
In this example, the IT administrator gives permission (for example, to a technician) for 
a previously created key to be used only during this boot cycle. First the administrator 
creates a key that has a policy controlled by a wild card. When the administrator wants 
to allow the technician to use the key, the admin reads the current boot counter value 
from the PC using TPM2_GetCapability and authorizes a policy for the key that states that 
the value of the boot counter must be its current value. The admin does this using their 
private key to sign this new policy, called newPolicy. If the key is in his own TPM, he can 
use the command TPM2_Sign to sign it. The admin sends this policy and signature to 
the technician.
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The technician loads the public key into the TPM, using TPM2_LoadExternal, and then 
uses the TPM2_VerifySignature command to verify the signature of the new policy. This 
command returns a ticket to the technician.
The technician uses the key by starting a policy session and then executing 
TPM2_PolicyCounterTimer with an offset pointing to the boot counter. This satisfies 
the newPolicy. The technician then executes TPM2_PolicyAuthorize, feeding it the 
newPolicy and the ticket, and points to the admin’s public key. The TPM verifies that the 
ticket is valid for the newPolicy, using the admin’s public key, and then substitutes the 
current policy buffer with the wildCardPolicy. At this point, the technician can use the 
key during this boot cycle.
When the PC is rebooted, the boot counter is incremented. If the technician tries to 
use the policy again, they can never satisfy newPolicy, so they can’t use the key.
Example 5: A Policy for Flexible PCRs
In this example, an IT administrator wants to lock a full-disk-encrypting software key 
to a set of PCRs that represent (among other things) the BIOS firmware. But the admin 
realizes that the BIOS might need to be updated and so uses TPM2_PolicyAuthorize to 
provide flexibility as to what PCR values are used to release the hard-disk encryption keys.
The admin’s key is created with only TPM2_PolicyAuthorize, but the admin authorizes 
a new policy that requires the PCRs to be equal to the initial PCR values. The admin then 
uses TPM2_VerifySignature to create a ticket that can be used to validate use of that 
new policy.
When the disk-encryption key is to be decrypted, the machine needs to do the 
following:
1. Start a new policy session.
2. Use TPM2_PolicyPCR to replicate the new policy in the TPM.
3. Use TPM2_PolicyAuthorize (with the public administrator 
key, the new policy, and the policy ticket) to cause the TPM to 
change the internal policy buffer of its session to the original 
PolicyAuthorize policy.
4. Use the satisfied policy session to release the disk-encryption key.
If the admin ever needs to change the PCR values that are validated, the admin can 
send the user a newly signed policy corresponding to the new PCR values, and the user 
can use that to create a new ticket to use after the PCRs have changed.
Example 6: A Policy for Group Admission
In this example, a group of people are given access to use a department key. But as  
people come and go from the department, some people’s access is removed and  
other people’s access is granted. Each member of the department has access to a  
private key that represents them. You can do this with a clever use of TPM2_PolicyNV,  
TPM2_PolicyAuthorize, and TPM2_PolicySigned.
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First you create a NV index that has 64 bits (assuming there will never be more than 
64 people in your department). Write authority is given only to the IT administrator, using 
the admin’s private key. The admin writes it with all zeroes, noting the value of the index 
name. The admin then creates the department key with only a PolicyAuthorize policy, 
with the public key corresponding to the IT administrator of the department.
The IT administrator assigns each member of the group a bit in the NV space. To 
give a user the right to use the key, the admin creates and approves a policy that requires 
the corresponding bit of the NVRAM index to be a 1 (using PolicyNV) and that the 
appropriate user use their private key for authentication, using PolicySigned. When the 
admin wants to remove a user’s ability to use the key, the admin changes the bit in the 
NVIndex that corresponds to that user to a 0. The admin then signs each of these new 
policies and gives them to the appropriate user.
When a user wants to use the key, they do the following:
1. Start a policy session.
2. Executed a PolicyNV command to verify the user is still in the 
department.
3. Execute a PolicySigned command to prove the user is the 
corresponding person.
4. Execute a PolicyAuthorize command to change the TPM’s 
internal policy buffer to the PolicyAuthorize policy.
5. Use the key.
Example 7: A Policy for NV RAM between 1 and 100
As noted earlier, this is as simple as executing two commands: one to say the NV RAM 
value is greater than 1 and another to say it’s less than 100. This only allows values  
2, 3, 4, ...99.
Compound Policies: Using Logical OR in a Policy
The TPM2_PolicyOR command completes the logical constructions that can be done 
with policies and makes it possible to create useful policies that will do anything logically 
feasible. It lets you join more than one policy in multiple branches, any of which can be 
taken in satisfying a compound policy, as shown in Figure 14-5.
Although TPM2_PolicyOR commands can be used in more complicated settings, it’s 
easiest to create individual policies for specific means of authorizing use of an entity and 
then use TPM2_PolicyOR to create a compound policy. Usually this is done by creating 
simple policies by ANDing assertions together to represent either a person or a role, and 
then ORing the simple policies together.
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Suppose the following things happen:
1. Dave authorizes himself using a policy created by a fingerprint 
together with a password when at one machine.
2. Dave authorizes himself using a password and smart card.
3. Sally uses her smart card and an iris scanner to authorize herself.
4. The IT administrator can only use his authorization to 
duplicate a key and must use a smart card when the system is 
in a state defined by PCR0-5 having specific values.
This can be represented pictorially using circuit diagrams as follows.
Figure 14-5. A Compound Policy as a Circuit Diagram
The easy way to create this compound policy is to start by creating four individual 
branch policies corresponding in the picture to Dave1, Dave2, Sally, and IT.
The first policy (Dave1) defines that Dave must authenticate himself with an external 
device (a fingerprint reader) and have it testify that Dave has authenticated himself. Dave 
must then present a password to the TPM. As you have seen, this is as simple as doing 
the following:
1. Start a trial session.
2. Use TPM2_PolicySigned (with the fingerprint reader’s public 
key and appropriate policyRef).
3. Use TPM2_PolicyAuthValue.
4. Get the value of the policy from the TPM. Call this policyDave1.
5. End the session.
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The second policy (Dave2) has Dave present a password to the TPM and then use 
his smart card to sign a nonce from the TPM to prove his is the authorized owner of the 
smart card:
1. Start a trial session.
2. Use TPM2_PolicyAuthValue.
3. Use TPM2_PolicySigned (with the smart card’s public key).
4. Get the value of the policy from the TPM. Call this 
policyDave2.
5. End the session.
The third policy states that Sally must first use her smart card to sign a nonce from 
the TPM to prove she is the authorized owner of her smart card and then authorize 
herself to an external device, an iris scanner, and have the external device testify to the 
TPM that Sally has authenticated herself:
1. Start a trial session.
2. Use TPM2_PolicySigned (with the smart card’s public key).
3. Use TPM2_PolicySigned (with the iris scanner’s public key 
and appropriate policyRef).
4. Get the value of the policy from the TPM. Call this 
policySally.
5. End the session.
Finally, the IT administrator’s policy requires the administrator to use his smart 
card to sign a nonce produced by the TPM and then also check that PCRs 0–5 are in the 
expected state. Furthermore, the IT administrator can only use this authorization to 
duplicate the key:
1. Start a trial session.
2. Use TPM2_PolicySigned (with the smart card’s public key).
3. Use TPM2_PolicyPCR (with PCRs selected and their  
required digest).
4. Use TPM2_PolicyCommandCode with TPM_CC_Duplicate.
5. Get the value of the policy from the TPM. Call this policyIT.
6. End the session.
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Making a Compound Policy
Each of these policies, by itself, could be assigned to a TPM entity such as a key. However, 
you wish to allow any of the policies to be used to authenticate access to a key, and you do 
this using the TPM2_PolicyOR command:
1. Start a trial session.
2. Use TPM2_PolicyOR, giving it the list of policies to be allowed: 
policyDave1, policyDave2, policySally, and policyIT.
3. Get the value of the policy from the TPM. Call this policyOR.
4. End the session.
Policies created this way on one TPM will work fine on any TPM. One restriction 
on PolicyOr is that it can only be used to OR together up to eight policies. However, just 
as with electronic circuit design, PolicyORs can be compounded together to create the 
equivalent of an unlimited number of ORs. For example, if X is the result of 8 policies 
ORed together with TPM2_PolicyOR, and Y is the result of a different 8 policies ORed 
together with PolicyOR, you can apply TPM2_PolicyOR to X and Y to create the equivalent 
of a PolicyOr of 16 different policies.
Example: A Policy for Work or Home Computers
John has a home PC with a fingerprint reader and a work PC with a smart-card reader. 
He wants to authorize reading his cloud-based encrypted data from either computer. 
He does this by locking a key to a policy that requires a fingerprint reader from his home 
computer and his smart card (using his work PC’s smart-card reader) for work.
He first creates a policy for his home computer. He gets the public key of the 
fingerprint reader and sets it up to sign “John’s fingerprint” when he swipes his finger on 
that reader:
1. Start a trial session.
2. Use TPM2_LoadExternal to load the fingerprint reader’s public 
key into the home computer’s TPM.
3. Use TPM2_PolicySigned (with the fingerprint reader’s public 
key and appropriate policyRef).
4. Get the value of the policy from the TPM. Call this 
HomeFingerprintPolicy.
5. End the session.
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John now goes to his work computer:
1. Start a trial session.
2. Use TPM2_LoadExternal to load the smart card’s public key 
into the work computer’s TPM.
3. Use TPM2_PolicySigned (with the smart card’s public key and 
NULL policyRef).
4. Get the value of the policy from the TPM. Call this policy 
WorkSmart cardPolicy.
5. End the session.
Now John can create the combined policy, which can be satisfied with both 
computers:
1. Start a trial session.
2. Use TPM2_PolicyOr with both HomeFingerprintPolicy and 
WorkSmart cardPolicy listed.
3. Get the value of the policy from the TPM. Call this policy 
WorkOrHomePolicy.
4. End the session.
This is the policy John uses when creating a key that he will use to identify himself to 
the cloud. He duplicates this key to his other computer, and then he can securely use this 
key on either computer.
Considerations in Creating Policies
In most cases, policies should be considered to represent roles when using TPM 
entities—and usually there are only a few possible roles.
End User Role
This represents the authentication that is satisfied for a user to use an entity. Using an 
entity means doing something like one of the following:
Signing with a key•	
Reading a NV location•	
Writing an NV location•	
Quoting with a key•	
Creating keys•	
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Administrator Role
An administrator of an entity may do different things for different entities. For NVRAM, 
they may be given the responsibility of managing the limited resource of available 
NVRAM. This would include the following:
For NV:•	
Creating and destroying NV indexes•	
For keys:•	
Authorizing duplication•	
Changing authorization with •	 PolicyAuthorize
Understudy Role
In the event that the user of a key leaves the company or is unable to use a key necessary 
to obtain some enterprise data, it’s important that another person (for example, the user’s 
manager) be able to use the key. This is an understudy role.
Office Role
An office role consists of a combination (PolicyOr) of an enterprise administrator role 
and the user’s role.
Home Role
A home role consists of a combination of a user acting as an administrator and acting as an 
end user. It may also include using different roles for using an entity on different machines, 
because different forms of authentication may be available on different machines. (For 
example, one machine may have a biometric reader and another may not.)
Once the roles are defined, policies can be created for them. Once the policies are 
created, they can be reused whenever entities are created, obviating the need to re-create 
the policies each time.
Using a Policy to Authorize a Command
You’ve seen how to satisfy a number of simpler policies. In order to satisfy any policy so 
that an object that requires the policy can be used, the steps are always the same:
1. Start a policy session.
2. Satisfy the policy for that session (this can require multiple steps).
3. Execute the command.
4. End the session.
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This is very similar to the way policies are created, but satisfying a policy often 
requires additional steps. In a high-level API, most of the grunt work of satisfying a policy 
is done for you; but if you’re talking directly to the TPM, some details are required to 
achieve this.
Starting the Policy
Starting the PolicySession is easy, as shown in Chapter 13. It’s done with the command 
TPM2_StartAuthSession. This command returns a bunch of stuff, including a session 
handle, here called myPolicySessionHandle; and a nonce, created by the TPM, here 
called nonceTPM. You need both of these variables to satisfy the policy.
Satisfying a Policy
The considerations for satisfying the different kinds of policies—simple assertions, 
multifactor assertions, compound assertions, and flexible assertions—are slightly 
different, so let’s consider them separately. It’s important to remember that the order 
in which a policy is satisfied is important. A policy constructed with a TPM2_PolicyPCR 
followed by TPM2_PolicyPassword is different from a policy constructed with  
TPM2_PolicyPassword followed by TPM2_PolicyPCR. In general, policy commands  
aren’t commutative.
Simple Assertions and Multifactor Assertions
Most simple assertions are easy to apply to a policy. Password, PCR, locality, TPM 
internal state, internal state of an NV RAM location, and command-based assertions are 
asserted in the same way as when the policy was created, except instead of using a trial 
policy, you use the policy handle myPolicySessionHandle. Other commands that require 
signature verification (the TPM2_PolicySigned command with or without a policyRef) 
require more work.
For example, if you’re asserting that a password must be used to satisfy the policy, 
you execute the command TPM2_PolicyPassword. The password isn’t actually passed at 
this time. This is just telling the session that when the command is finally executed with 
the object, the user must prove at that time that they know the password by passing it in 
either as a plaintext password or as an HMAC in the session.
To satisfy TPM2_PolicySigned, a signature is needed, and the signature is over a 
hash that is formed in part from the nonceTPM returned by the last use of the session. 
Additionally, the TPM must have the public key loaded so that it can verify the signature.
Loading the public key is done exactly the same way you did it to create the session, 
using the TPM2_LoadExternal command. This returns a handle to the loaded public key, 
here called aPublicHandle. You use this when calling the PolicySigned command, but 
first you have to pass in a signature. To do this, you first need to form a hash and sign it. 
The hash is formed by
 
aHash = HASH(nonceTPM || expiration =0 || cpHashA = NULL || policyRef = 0x0000)
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where nonceTPM was returned by the TPM when the session was created, expiration is all 
zeroes (no expiration), cpHashA = Empty Auth, and policyRef is emptyBuffer. (If you’re 
using this for verification of a biometric reader, then policyRef is equal to the name of 
the person whose biometric was verified). The private key is used to sign this hash; and 
when signed, the result is called mySignature.
Next you execute the TPM2_PolicySigned command, passing in the handle of the 
session, APublicHandle, and mySignature. At this point, the TPM checks the signature 
internally using the public key, and if it’s verified, extends its internal session policy buffer 
as desired. Now any command with an object whose policy that matches that policy 
buffer can be executed.
If the Policy Is Compound
If a policy is compound—that is, it’s a logical OR of several branches—the user knows 
which branch they’re going to try to satisfy. Once the user picks the branch, they 
satisfy that branch and then execute a TPM2_PolicyOR command with the TPM, which 
transforms the satisfied branch into the final policy, ready for execution. See Figure 14-6.
Figure 14-6. An example of using an OR policy
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This figure shows that there are four different ways to satisfy this policy. You can 
satisfy it with the first branch, Dave1, by using a fingerprint reader and a password:
1. Start a policy session.
2. Satisfy the Dave1 branch of the policy:
a. Satisfy the fingerprint assertion using TPM2_
PolicySigned.
b. Satisfy the password assertion using TPM2_
PolicyPassword.
3. This sets a flag in the session, telling it that a password must 
be sent in when the final command is executed.
4. Transform the TPM’s session policy buffer to the final session 
value using TPM2_PolicyOR.
5. Execute the command, including both the policy session 
and another session that satisfies the flag, by passing in the 
password (which can be done using the password [PWAP] 
permanent session).
Note:      As a side note, the policy session can be told to 
automatically close after this command is completed. 
Failing that, you can close the session manually.
In order to satisfy the first assertion in the policy, you have to get the fingerprint 
reader to attest to the TPM that Dave’s fingerprint has been matched by the reader with the 
public key aPub. To do this, you need to pass a message to sign in to the fingerprint reader, 
which is calculated in part from nonceTPM, which the TPM returned when you created the 
policy. This value is sent to the fingerprint reader. Then Dave swipes his finger along the 
fingerprint reader, and when the fingerprint reader matches his fingerprint, it signs
aHash = SHA256(nonceTPM || expiration=0 || cpHashA=NULL || state Of 
Remote Device)
using its private key aprivate. Note here the PolicyRef is the state of the remote device. 
In particular, the fingerprint reader needs to sign the fact that Dave has just swiped one 
of his fingerprints on the device and it has matched the template the device stored. The 
result is called fingerprint_Signature.
Next you have to load the fingerprint reader’s public key into the TPM. Recall that 
this public key’s handle is aPub.
Finally, the TPM is sent proof that the fingerprint reader successfully identified Dave 
using the command TPM2_PolicySigned, passing in aPub and fingerprint_Signature.
Next you execute the PolicyAuthValue command, which promises that when you 
eventually ask the TPM to perform a command with an object, that user will present 
evidence that they know the password associated with the object. This is done by 
executing TPM2_PolicyAuthValue.
Now that you’ve satisfied one of the branches of the policy, you can execute  
TPM2_PolicyOR to change the internal buffer of the session to equal the compound policy 
by passing it a list of the ORed policies.
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If the Policy Is Flexible (Uses a Wild Card)
Satisfying a wild card policy is more complicated than creating one. For one thing, when 
the wild card policy is created, only the public key of the party who can authorize the 
eventually satisfied policy is identified. When one is used, an authorized policy must 
have been created, and a ticket proving that it’s authorized must be produced. Then a 
user satisfies the approved policy and runs TPM2_PolicyAuthorize. The TPM checks that 
the policy buffer matches the approvedPolicy and that the approvedPolicy is indeed 
approved (by using the ticket), and if it is, changes the policy buffer to the flexible policy.
Preparing a policy to be used is then a two-step process. First, the authorizing party 
has to approve a policy by using their private key to sign Hash(approved Policy || 
wildCardName=policyRef). This is then sent to the user.
The user loads the public key of the authorizing party in their TPM and uses  
TPM2_VerifySignature against this signature, pointing to the handle of the public key. 
Upon verification, the TPM produces a ticket for this policy.
When the user wants to use this new approved policy, the user first satisfies the 
approved policy the way they ordinarily would and then gets the TPM to switch the 
approved policy to the flexible policy by calling TPM2_PolicyAuthorize, giving it as 
parameters the name of the session that has satisfied the approved policy, the approved 
policy, wildCardName, keyName, and the ticket. The TPM verifies that the ticket is correct 
and matches the approved policy in the session policy buffer. If so, it changes the session 
policy buffer to be the value of the flexible policy.
Thus creating a flexible policy is really a two part process.
Recapitulating: First the policy itself is created:
Start a Trial Session•	
Load the administrator’s public key•	
Use TPM2_PolicyAuthorize pointing to the administrator’s public key•	
Get the Value of the policy from the TPM. We call this policy •	
workSmartcardPolicy
End the session•	
Then an authorized policy is created using the administrator’s private key
Create a policy•	
Load the administrator’s private key•	
Use the administrator’s private key to sign the policy•	
Use the TPM on which the approved policy is to be used to verify •	
the signature (this produces a ticket)
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Satisfying the Approved Policy
Satisfying the approved policy is done just as though it were the only policy you had to 
worry about. It doesn’t matter if the approved policy is simple, compound, or flexible. 
After it’s satisfied, it’s then transformed.
Transforming the Approved Policy in the Flexible Policy
Now that the TPM’s buffer is equal to the approved policy, you can transform it into the 
flexible policy by executing TPM2_PolicyAuthorize, passing the current value of the 
session policy buffer, PolicyTicket, and AdministratorPublicKeyHandle. The TPM 
checks that the policy buffer matches the approved policy and that the approved policy is 
indeed approved (by using the ticket) and, if it is, changes the policy buffer to the flexible 
policy. At this point, commands can be executed on an object that requires this particular 
flexible policy.
Although flexible policies were introduced to the TPM in order to provide a solution 
to the brittleness of PCRs, they can be used to solve many more conundrums than that. 
They allow an administrator to decide after an object is created how the policy for that 
object can be satisfied. Because the name of an object (or NV index) is calculated from 
its policy, it isn’t possible to change the policy of an NV index or a key. However, using a 
flexible policy, you can change the way a policy is satisfied after the fact.
Suppose a key is given a flexible policy when it’s created, and later the administrator 
of the flexible policy wants to make it be the policy in Figure 14-6. The admin can 
accomplish this by signing the policy represented by Figure 14-6 and sending it to the 
user. Someone must do the preparatory step of creating a ticket by running  
TPM2_VerifySignature, but after that the user only has to satisfy the policy given by 
Figure 14-6 and then run PolicyAuthorize to prove that the policy has been approved.
Certified Policies
One last thing you can do with policies is prove that a policy is bound to a particular 
entity. When ink is used to sign a contract, the signature that is formed is irrevocably 
tied to the person signing it via a biometric that represents the way the person’s muscles 
and nerves are formed. That is what produces the characteristic swirls of a signature. 
Electronic signatures have never been tied to a person in the same way. Typically, 
electronic signatures have been tied to a password (something a person knows) or a 
smart card (something a person has), or sometimes (usually in addition to the others) 
a biometric. Biometric devices can break, so in most implementations, there is always a 
backup password that can be used if the biometric doesn’t work. (Interestingly, the ink 
signature has a similar problem, because people can break their hands.)
With the TPM 2.0, it’s possible to tie the use of a key directly to a biometric and 
prove that it’s so tied. First a non-duplicatable key is created, with its authValue set so 
that a password isn’t useful for authorization. This means only the policy can be used to 
authorize use of the key. The policy is set to only allow use of the key when authorized by 
Chapter 14 ■ extended authorization (ea) poliCies 
248
a biometric reader, using TPM2_PolicySign and a policyRef that is produced and signed 
by the biometric reader when it matches the person. This produces a key that can only be 
used to sign something if the biometric reader is convinced the person is who it thinks the 
person is. We call this key A.
Next a credentialed non-duplicable restricted signing key is used with TPM2_Certify 
to produce a signature over the name of key A. This signature binds the public portion 
of key A (which is in the name), the authValue (which are in the name), and the policy 
(which is in the name). By checking the credential of the restricted signing key, an 
attesting agent can verify that the certificate produced by TPM2_Certify is valid. Then, by 
hashing the public data of the key, the agent can verify that the name is correct. This then 
validates that the only way the key could be used for signing is by satisfying the policy, 
not by a password. The policy is then examined and, using the public key of the biometric 
device, is validated to be satisfied only if the user swiped their finger over the reader.
In this way, the electronic signature with the key becomes tied to the fingerprint 
biometric. In a similar way, producing certificates binding policies to keys can be used 
to prove to an auditor that the policies being used for keys meet a corporate standard for 
security. This in turn satisfies the last of the problems that EA was created to solve.
Summary
This chapter has examined the new enhanced authorization in the TPM 2.0, which can 
be used to authorize any entity in the TPM. You have seen that EA policies can be used to 
create logical combinations (AND and OR) of multiple kinds of assertions—everything 
from passwords and smart cards to the state of the TPM or the state of a remote machine. 
You have looked at examples of using EA for multiple users, multifactor authorization, 
and the means to create policies that allow flexible management. Many examples 
demonstrated the ways these commands can be used to solve varied problems. Then you 
saw how such policies can be satisfied. Finally, you saw how a key can be bound to its 
policy. EA in the TPM 2.0 is one of the most complex but also most useful new capabilities 
in the TPM 2.0 design.
